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A perennial problem of folklore  concerns the  search f o r  method. While 
folklore  study has managed t o  amass considerable quan t i t i es  of da t a ,  f o l k l o r i s t i c  
science has usual ly  f a i l e d  t o  apply any consistent  approaches t o  the  organization 
of t h i s  data .  I n  sho r t ,  fo lklore  as  a science i s  a t  be s t  s t i l l  i n  i t s  infancy. 
An understanding of the  nature of theory,  i n  the  par t i cu la r  and rigorous form t h a t  
t heo re t i c a l  expressions take i n  the  sciences,  i s  useful  t o  the  f o l k l o r i s t  i n  two 
ways. There i s  the  obvious benef i t  of knowing how t o  properly forr,iulate a theory 
based on collected data .  But it i s  the second use t h a t  concerns me here ,  and 
t h i s  i s  u t i l i z i n g  the  t heo re t i c a l  form as  a model f o r  human thought pat terns .  
I n  the  course of t h i s  paper I w i l l  argue f i r s t  t h a t  the  theore t ica l  form corres- 
ponds i n  s t ruc ture  t o  the  knowledge and be l i e f  patterns of human thought. Second, 
I w i l l  argue t h a t  t h i s  framework can be of value t o  f o l k l o r i s t s  when used as a 
basic  pat tern  fo r  describing and finding the  re la t ions  within the  be l i e f  systems 
of individuals and cul tures .  
Science seeks t o  understand as  thoroughly a s  possible the  sum of what 
e x i s t s .  Understanding must consis t  first of accumulating da t a ,  and second of 
giving meaning t o  our chaos of observations. To f ind  meaning i s  t o  f i nd  pat tern ,  
and men have usual ly  been s z t i s f i e d  only r e t h  f inding cause and e f f e c t ,  beginning 
and end, explanation and law. This search continues, though now we r ea l i z e  t h a t  
we must be s a t i s f i e d  shor t  of ar.y absolute t r u th s .  S t i l l ,  even i f  we cannot knbw 
the  ult imate czuse of some phenomenon, it i s  valuable t o  know the  event t h a t  
causes (or always accompanies) another event. I explain how the  sun i s  eclipsed 
if I say the moon has passed d i r e c t l y  i n  f ron t  of it. 'l 'his explanation i s  s a t i s -  
fying within l i m i t s  even though I have not mentioned such things a s  l i g h t  and 
shadow, c e l e s t i a l  mechanics,or the  or igin  of the  universe, which would f igure  i h t o  
a f u l l e r  explanation of an ecl ipse .  
A major goal  of science,  then,  i s  t o  explain. Explanation i s  always r e l a t i v e  
t o  some c r i t e r i o n  t h a t  serves as  a reference,  or  s t a r t i n g  point. O f  course the  
bes t  explsnation would r e f e r  t o  some ult imate and unquestionable t r u th .  Yowever, 
t he  best  we can do i s  t o  explain i n  terms of a statement t h a t  i s  t r ue  +om one 
point of view, and t h a t  may be f a l s e  from other point of view. To subsume a 
statement about a par t i cu la r  event under a more general statement i s  t o  explain 
the  par t i cu la r  i n  t e rn s  of a %rider reference , l  though from a ye t  wider view the  
general  statement may be questioned. ll'or example, i f  a l l  so la r  ecl ipses  are caused 
by a dragon eating the  sun, then i f  event X i s  a so la r  ec l ipse ,  we explain event 
X when we say t h a t  it i s  a par t i cu la r  case of a dragon eat ing the  sun. Within 
i t s e l f  t h i s  i s  the  cor rec t  explanation f o r  so l a r  ec l ipses ,  but r e l a t i ve  t o  our view 
of the  nature of the  so l a r  systern, the  general statement, and thus the  explanation 
based on i t ,  i s  f a l s e .  
For s c i e n t i f i c  understanding we need more than a col lect ion of 12,~s. We need 
a systematic s t ruc ture  f o r  our statements, one t h a t  has a beginning point and 
which has c lea r  expression of whzt re la t ionships  a re  allowed. I dea l l y ,  we need a 
dBdactively re la ted  system. Such a frmework i s  provided by a t heo re t i c a l  system. 
Theory i n  i t s e l f  i s  not neces sa r i l j  a correct  descr ipt ion of nature.  Rather, 
theory i s  simply a group of statements t h a t  e.re systematically re la ted  t o  each 
other ,  and empirically t e ~ t a b l e . ~  They may be general  l a w s  but  not necessar i ly ;  
what i s  necessary i s  tthht a network of interdependent statements be formed. I n  
b r i e f ,  a s c i e n t i f i c  theory consis ts  of a group of elements and ru l e s  of re la t ion-  
sh ip  t h a t  a re  assumed t o  be t r u e ,  and from these basics  a system of der iva t ive  
elements and re la t ionships  a r e  deduced. When applied t o  nature it is  hoped 
t h a t  the  basic  par t s  of the  theory correspond t o  the  underlying mechanism of 
the  phenomenon i n  question,  while it i s  hoped t h a t  the derived par t s  of the  
theory correspond t o  features  of the  phenomenon t h a t  a re  dependent on t h e  lower 
layers  fo r  t h e i r  charac te r i s t i cs .  A theory i s  a descr ipt ion t h a t  t r i e s  t o  guess 
the mechanism behind some r e a l i t y .  It d i f f e r s  from other descr ipt ions  by having 
a de f in i t e  s t a r t i n g  point and de f in i t e  re la t ionships  between t he  par ts .  I must 
now consider the  s t ruc tu r e  of theory i n  greater  d e t a i l ,  
Theory i s  fundamentally a language. Theory i n  i t s  simplest terms consis ts  
of vocabulary and grammar, t ha t  i s ,  a s e t  of e l~men t , s  t h a t  may be s ing le  words, 
mathematical symbols, whole statements, or  any other th ing t h a t  can b~ t rea ted  
as a simplest term; and a set, t h a t  specify  how the  elements may l e g i t i -  
mately be ordered. The overriding order i n  a t heo re t i c a l  system i s  subordination, 
with a l l  derived elements and ru les  re la ted  as  consequences t o  a group of 
i n i t i a l l y  chosen elements and ru les .  Out of a l l  the  possibly ex i s t en t  elements 
some a re  chosen t o  have no synonyms within t he  theory,  and a re  ca l led  primitives.  
A l l  other elements allowed i n  the  system must have synonyms, and thus these 
elements can be defined ul t imately  i n  terms of the primitives.  The ru l e s  of 
r e l a t i o n  operate i n  a similar way--some ru l e s  are  se lected from a l l  the  possible 
ru les  t o  serve a s  axioms, or ru les  accepted without fu r ther  proof. A l l  other 
possible ru les  a re  derived from these basic ru les .  Their expression depends on 
the  p r io r  existence of t he  basic  ru les .  To make these der ivat ions ,  a s e t  of r u l e s  
f o r  def in i t ion  and transformation a r e  needed. These a re  ru les  t h a t  specify ,  
respect ively ,  the  def in i t ions  t h a t  a re  permitted and the  ways i n  which d i f f e r en t  
r u l e s  can be made from the i n i t i a l  s e t  of ru les .  
'l'he system I have described so  f a r  i s  purely formal. I have not been con- 
cerned with knowing the  meaning of the  terms, but only how the  terms f i t  bogether 
i n  accord with the  ru les  we use. To i l l u s t r a t e :  the  ru l e s  might specify  t h a t  a 
sentence s t ruc ture  "art icle--subject  noun--verb--object noun" i s  proper, and t h i s  
i s  a sentence of form as opposed t o  "The boy ran home," which i s  a sentence with 
meaning interpreted i n t o  the  form. I f  the  sentence i s  properly constructed i n  
accord with i t s  ru les  the  formal system w i l l  bear i n t e r n a l  consistency, and i t s  
statements can be sa id  t o  be t r ue  with reference t o  the  system of which they 
a re  a par t .  But science i s  concerned f o r  t r u t h  with reference t o  nature.  What 
we want, then,  i s  a meani-nq t o  give t o  t h i s  system so  t h a t  %he systeln will a l so  
be t r ue  when we use it t o  describe our observations of r e a l i t y .  We can add 
ru l e s  of i n t e rp re t a t i on  t o  give meaning t o  t he  elements and ru l e s ,  and give 
various meanings t o  the  formal system. men we may t e s t  each i n t e rp re t a t i on  of 
meaning t o  see i f  it i s  t rue  t o  the  r e a l i t y  t h a t  concerns us. By i t s  formal 
c cr:~ls.t;e?nj- we know t h a t  i f  the  axioms a r e  t r ue  then the  derived re la t ionsh ips ,  
which are  r e l a t ed  by deduction t o  the axioms, must be t rue .  I f  the  axioms and 
derived re la t ionships  correspond t o  observed r e a l i t y ,  then we know t h a t  t he  
language of re la t ionships  t h a t  composes our theory i s  a proper descr ipt ion of 
a phenomenon and i t s  underlying mechanism. Such a theory stands u n t i l  some 
of the  da ta  f>:.lsto f i t .  Then a d i f f e r en t  i n t e rp re t a t i on  of t he  same system 
t o  b e t t e r  f i t  the  da t a  may be t r i e d ,  or a whole new theory may be required.3 
The Copernican theory of the  so l a r  system may be used t o  fu r ther  i l l u s t r a t e .  
The task  of Copernicus i s  t o  explain how the  c e l e s t i a l  bodies move a s  they a r e  
observed t o  do,  and t o  give a b e t t e r  account than Ptolemy's geocentric theory 
does. Copernicus begins h i s  theory with such ~r i -mi  t,ives as  heavenly bodies,  
t h e  concept of planetary motion i n  some form or other ,  and geometric shapes. 
From these th ree  primitives he can bu i ld  the  defined term of o r b i t ,  which is the  
motion of one planet r e l a t i ve  t o  another, i n  such a way t h a t  the  motion of the  
f i r s t  planet ascr ibes  a c i r cu l a r  path t h a t  i s  centered on the  second. I f  he 
t akes  a par t  of the  problem, such as the  f a c t  of day and n igh t ,  then it i s  
possible t h a t  a new sun i s  born da i l y ,  t h a t  the  same sun o rb i t s  the  ea r th ,  or  
t h a t  t he  ea r th  turns  on i t s  ax i s  while orbi t ing t he  sun. Copernicus chooses 
the  he l iocen t r ic  view as  an axiomatic assumption, so  h i s  ru les  of re la t ionsh ip  
must include t h a t  the  sun i s  cen t r a l  and the ea r th  moves i n  an o rb i t  around 
t he  sun. fl necessary consequence derived from t h i s  assumption, i f  day and 
night a re  t o  be accounted f o r ,  i s  t h a t  the  ea r th  not only o rb i t s  but  a l s o  tu rns  
on i t s  axis. This l a t t e r  conclusion i s  not at a l l  obvious, but necessary 
according t o  the  assumptions. 
It might be added t h a t  Copernicus did  not know t h a t  he was r i gh t .  He 
simply made a guess t h a t  the sun wah cen t r a l  and. worked out a model f o r  how 
the  ea r th  must behave. A s  it turned out the  hel iocentr ic  model d id  make 
be t t e r  predictions f o r  planetary motion (than Ptolemyls) and i t s  accuracy has 
been borne out by subsequent t e s t s .  The important point with reference t o  theory 
i s  t h a t  theory does not depic t  the  necessar i ly  t r ue  mechanism of r e a l i t y .  The 
t heo re t i c a l  model i s  an a r t i f i c i a l  construct  t h a t  proves t o  work as wel l  as an 
account of whatever " rea l"  mechanism there  may be,  at l e a s t  i n  terms of accounting 
f o r  what i s  observed and predicting what w i l l  be observed. It i s  the  be s t  guess 
we can make, and the best  device we have fo r  giving an orderly account of what 
we observe, but it i s  s t i l l  a guess. The value of a theory a s  a descr ipt ive  
device l i e s  i n  the  f ac t  t ha t  it t r e a t s  da ta  i n  terms of re la t ionships .  Each 
f a c t  i s  not equally sovereign i n  a theory,  but is ranked somewhere i n  a hier-  
archy. There i s  a s t a r t i n g  point ,  r i gh t  or wrong, i n  the basic  elements and 
r u l e s  and everything e l s e  t h a t  i s  accepted i n t o  the  system bears a de f in i t e  
re la t ionsh ip  t o  the s t a r t i n g  points. A few fac tors  become the  means t o  t r e a t  a 
great  number of o thers ,  so  i n  a theory there i s  var ie ty  and un i ty  at  the  same 
time. I n  t h i s  sense theory gives meaning t o  the chaos of perception. 
Now, my concern with theory i n  t h i s  b r i e f  account has not been t o  show 
f o l k l o r i s t s  how t o  construct  theor ies  f o r  t h e i r  data.  $ 1 ~  concern has been t o  
provide background f o r  two asser t ions:  1 )  Individual  thought operates as a 
t heo re t i c a l  system. 2 )  The idea t iona l  aspect of cul ture  operates as a theore t ica l  
system. I propose t h a t  human knowledge, t o  be knowledge at  a l l ,  i s  a system of 
re la ted  elements, and is arranged i n  a hierarchy t h a t  more or l e s s  r e f e r s  back 
t o  i n i t i a l  assumptions. There can be no doubt t h a t  the re  i s  order expressed i n  
human thought and act ion,  and it is a t t e s t ed  t o  by the  presence of language, 
na r ra t ive ,  myth, and soc i a l  organization. i4'urthermore, a re la t ionsh ip  of subor- 
d inat ion manifests i t s e l f  i n  most, i f  not a l l  cul tures .  That i s ,  men perceive 
t he  existence of cause and e f f ec t  even i f  it i s  expressed in  such simple terms 
a s  saying t h a t  an acorn is a necessary antecendent f o r  an oak, or a mother f o r  
a baby. More wide-ranging questions of meaning a r e  answered by re l ig ion ,  which 
may explain the  or igins  of the  world and the  ult imate f a t e  of men. 1~ d e i t y  may 
serve a s  an answer beyond which it i s  impossible t o  quustion, and thus provides 
a de f in i t e  s t a r t i n g  point f o r  any system of understanding. Earth,  f i r e ,  water, 
and a i r  may serve as the  primitives from which a l l  other objects a r e  derived,  
and a h ie ra rch ica l  sequence of ru les  of r e l a t i on  can be seen i n  the  be l i e f  t h a t  
disease i s  a punishment f o r  disobeying the  laws of the  dei ty .  I n  shor t ,  the 
charac te r i s t i cs  of theory a re  po ten t ia l ly  present i n  human knowledge and b e l i e f .  
It i s  a long jump from potential  t o  the assertion tha t  a theore t ica l  
pattern i s  innate i n  a l l  human knowledge. fIuman learning probably i s  a more or  
l e s s  haphazard process, and I do not suggest t ha t  the mind begins with assumptions 
and systematically derives the consequences of these assumptions. ilhile there 
may be a deep structure of the mind, and a fixed pattern of organization i n  a l l  
human hought, I am concerned with knowledge more or l e s s  on the conscious leve l  
with what people know from t h e i r  experience and the i r  leaning from others, I 
am a lso  concerned with what people believe they know, and with the interpretat ions 
and explanations they use t o  account for  what they know and believe. I cannot 
c laim tha t  one person knows f u l l y  the system of h is  own culture,  nor tha t  any 
one cul ture  includes a l l  ideational poss ib i l i t ies .  I w i l l  simply say tha t  an 
individual knows parts  of the sum t o t a l  of the knowledge of h i s  culture,  some 
of it as unrelated fac t  and some of it as a related system. Out of t h i s  know- 
ledge, most people are  able t o  solve problems or give explanations by refer-ring 
t o  generalizations. I f  nothing e l se ,  a p r s o n  may know the system of h is  
knowledge i n  out l ine,  so he can f a l l b a c k  on fundamentals, such as a de i ty ,  as  
a general explanation fo r  what he does not undentand i n  de ta i l .  hny f u l l  
expression of an  individual or cu l tura l  ideational system may reveal missng s teps 
i n  the derivational sequence or logical ly  inconsistent features within the 
system. Xelationships need not be made by deduction, but we should expect t o  
find induction, analogy, metaphor, and circumstantial association as  the means 
of making l inks within human knowledge systems. Several systems with d i f fe rent ,  
even contradictory fundamental assumptions may coexist i n  the same person or 
cul ture ,  and never be resolved. Only idea l  theories are  perfect systems of 
thorough subordination, while even i n  science theories are ra re ly  well-formed 
formulations . 
Each person possesses an organized account created from cul tura l  inculcation 
and a personal synthesis. From b i r t h  the individual perceives objects,  which 
become nouns, and actions,  which become verbs. He experiences sequences of event8 
and learns what thing invariably AcCompanies another, which may lead t o  expressions 
of cause and ef fec t .  This experience a l so  teaches him t o  anticipate consequences, 
so he gains the power t p  predict. lieanwhile the individual learns from the 
culture of which he i s  a part. Learning words and grammar shapes what he i s  
able t o  communicate and the ways i n  which he may communicate it. He learns 
customs and soc ia l  patterns. ihe educational process, formal and informal, passes 
on t o  the individual the asnwers t o  questions he may ask and even t e l l s  him what 
questions are  relevant t o  ask. Out of a l l  t h i s  input the individual develops a 
personal synthesis. Some things are  taken t o  be t rue without doubt, and some 
of these t ru ths  are  more important for  understanding the ---",u~e of .t5e wcrld than 
are  others. ilround these central ly  important t ru ths  a l l  other input i s  in ter -  
preted, whenever there i s  the need t o  in te rpre t  it. Part of the organization 
thus derives from the presentation of cu l tura l  data ,  and part  derives from the 
personal work of relat ing the data. ' The re su l t  i s  the individual 's  organized 
account of the world. 
To say tha t  an individual knows, and i s  a product of his cul ture ,  means t h a t  
the individual possesses an organized account of h i s  world. It seems t o  be i n  
the nature of the organization of conscious thought t h a t  human knowledge closely 
resembles a theore t ica l  system. Further study i s  needed t o  declare t h a t  human 
knowledge i s  i n  f ac t  such a system, but a t  a minimum the theore t ica l  model pro- 
vides a useful scheme fo r  describing human thought. Culture, as a mode of 
learned behavior, i s  more than simply a system of kn0wled~e.4 I n  i t s  ideational 
aspect,  culture approaches what we have dea l t  with i n  the individual. I f  we 
t r e a t  ideational culture as the f u l l  repertoire of ideas found among a 
group of people, then we do not f i nd  an organized account of the  world but ra ther  
a col lect ion of a l l  the  po ten t ia l  accounts, and elements from which t o  bui ld  an 
account, t ha t  a member of t h i s  cul ture  might d r m  on. I n  t h i s  sense cul ture  i s  not 
a theore-tic: l's:.ctcm but i n  f a c t  a collect5on of systems, On the  other hand we 
might recognize the  individual  as  the  ult imate bearer of ideas.  Idea t iona l  cul ture  
must then be ithe idea t iona l  pat tern  of each individual ,  and thus a t heo re t i c a l  
system i n  the same sense t h a t  individual  thought i s .  I f  r:e seek t;'n?.t i s  general  
and charac te r i s t i c  of the  thought of a specif ied grcup, then ~6 may e s t ab l i sh  
some normative c r i t e r i o n  f o r  expressin? the  idea-tional cul ture .  Whether or not 
t h e  r e s u l t  of t h i s  kind of process ~ d e l d s  idea t iona l  cul ture  as a t heo re t i c a l  
system depends on what i s  abstracted.  Xf a normzl pat tern  f o r  ideat ion i s  souzht, 
then something l i k e  a world view may r e s u l t ,  and t h i s  can be krea-ted a s  a thcory. 
I f  normal ideas a re  sought independent of t h e i r  organization, thzn of course a 
t heo re t i c a l  scheme cannot r e su l t .  However, i f  idea t iona l  cul ture  i s  t r ea t ed  as 
t h e  learned thought patter 'n of individuals ,  or a s  the average world view of a 
cu l tu re  group, then cul ture  can be t rea ted  2s a t h e o r e t i c 9  systsm. 
I f  individual  and cu l t u r a l  thought can i n  f a c t  be regarded ads t heo re t i c a l  
systems, t h e  study of b e l i e f s  a s  a system shculd prove a f r u i t f u l  approach f o r  
folklore .  Instead of taldng our t ask  a s  f i n i s l ~ 4  kinen t;e hzve discovered a 
be l i e f  and i t s  function,  rre should i n  addit ion t r y  t o  determine how the  be l ie f  
f i t s  into:':? system of antecedent and con~equent be l i e f s .  To lk lo r i s t i c  mater ia l  
such a s  legends and fo lk  b e l i e f s  lend themselves wel l  t o  study undsr t h i s  approach. 
For example, a persoy1 who repor ts  a f ly ing  saucer ~ i g h t i n g  describes charac te r i t i c s  
of the  object t h a t  suggest a machin? and a d i s c  shz.pe. Let us take two poss ib i3 i t i s s  
along with t h i s  repor t :  F i r s t ,  independent evidence proves th2.t the object sighted 
was the  planet Venus, 2.nd second, no identi ,f ication of the  object i s  made other 
than t h e  one given by the >zitness. Such a case a s  the  f i r s t ,  i n  which we can 
compare r e a l i t y  and b e l i e f ,  i s  r a r e ,  and c l e a r l y  suggests t ha t  th.e r e a l i t y  of 
f ly ing  saucers i s  a fundmental  assumption, while ce r ta in  features  and re la t ion-  
ships are  en ta i l ed  by t h i s  assumption. Cur analysis  of t h i s  be l i e f  must include,  
a t  a minimum, del ineat ion of bas ic  asswnptfo~s and consequences both t a c i t  and 
e x p l i c i t .  &elated idezs ,  i n t e r n a l  i n c o n s i s t ~ n c i e s ,  reasoning processes by the  
witness,  and the  r e l a t i o n  between be l ie f  and behavior a re  only a few of the  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  t o  look f o r  once the  be l i e f  i t s e l f  i s  delineated.  This study 
can be conducted a s  an analysis  of the  sub j ec t ' s  b e l i e f s  without t he  invest ig2tor  
needing t o  add or i n f e r ,  s ince within the repor t  i t s e l f  r e l n t i o n s ~ ~ i p s  are present 
f o r  him t o  study. Of course i n  most cases no indeyendeqt id-ent i f ica t ion of what 
a be l ie f  i s  based on c m  be f~und ,  and the  job of f inding basic- :. (, .:.: ;:-. .;t-:r: 
becomes harder. Ho~rever, the  f ly ing saucer i n  the  repor t  may be taken at face 
-- ,?luz;i ts  ac tua l  i d e n t i t y  f a i l s  t o  change the  pat tern  of re1a;tionshiys i n  the 
repor t  i t s e l f .  'The bel ief  system taken i n  i t s e l f  does not change becs-~tse? we are  
ignorant of the  r e a l i t y  behind it. Cne ed-antage of the  t heo re t i c a l  system approach, 
then, i s  t h a t  the  subject  vs. observer problem i s  solved i n  favor of the  subject-- 
what he thinks can be described trithout the observer completely t r ans l a t i ng  and 
d i s to r t i ng  sihs?t the  observzd person believos.  The t heo re t i c a l  sys ten we dr2.w up 
i s  u l t imately  our product, and thus it pay not depic t  what the  subject  th inks ,  
but  at l e a s t  t he  pa t te rn  of re la t ionships  i n  the  sub j ec t ' s  be l i e f  i s  preserved. 
The recognition of pat tern  i n  h~unan be l i e f  r a i s e s  the  pos s ib i l i t y  f o r  advancing 
the  f i e l d  of fo lk lore ,  bu t  a t  the  same time obligss us t o  zdopt improved methcds 
of study. I have proposed t ha t  individu-a1 thought and the  idea t iona l  aspect of 
cul ture  a re  t heo re t i c a l  systems, or a t  l n a s t  can be describzd a s  such. This idea  
i s  nei ther  new nor shocking, yet  f o l k l o r i s t s  have f a i l e d  by and la rge  t o  pract ice  
the  kind of study such an approach e n t a i l s .  Cur pas t  e f f o r t s  have Likewise 
s t r i ven  t o  f ind  pa t t e rn  and re la t ionsh ip ,  but  we have usua l ly  worked haphazardly. 
The value of a t tacking human thought as operating i n  t h e o r e t i c a l  systems l i e s  
i n  the chance t o  add method t o  the  madness of our en te rpr i se .  
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